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1. Introduction 
Several theoretical studies argue that credit acts as a nonlinear propagator of shocks to 
the economy. Fluctuations in credit can even be the “cause” of business cycles (e.g. Blinder 
and Stiglitz 1983, Blinder 1987, Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, 
Azariadis and Smith 1998, Cordoba and Ripoll 2004). For example, Blinder (1987) constructs 
a model of credit rationing in which monetary shocks have stronger effects when the economy 
is in a credit-rationing regime. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develop a model of the business 
cycle in which borrowers’ balance sheet conditions are a source of investment and output 
fluctuations.  
More recently, Azariadis and Smith (1998) construct a dynamic equilibrium model 
explaining the relationship between credit and production, where the system can switch 
between the Walrasian and credit rationing regimes. In one version of this model, the 
economy experiences stochastic shifts between regimes in a Markovian manner, with the 
probability of regime transitions depending on the state of the system. The regime transitions 
are associated with fluctuations in output and capital stock. Cyclical contractions also involve 
declines in real interest rates, increases in credit rationing and withdrawal of savings from 
banks. 
The study of Azariadis and Smith provides a theoretical rationale for empirical 
analyses of nonlinear, regime-dependent relationships between credit rationing and economic 
activity (McCallum 1991, Galbraith 1996, Balke 2000, Calza and Sousa 2006, Kaufmann and 
Valderrama 2007). McCallum (1991) estimates the effect of monetary growth on output, 
using the standard regression model with dummy variables, and finds that the effect is 
stronger when an indicator of credit rationing exceeds a certain threshold. Similarly, Galbraith 
(1996), Balke (2000), Calza and Sousa (2006) estimate threshold regime-switching models 
and conclude that monetary and credit shocks have larger effects on economic activity in a 
credit-rationing regime. Psaradakis, Ravn and Sola (2005) and Kaufmann and Valderrama 
(2007) employ Markov-switching models and also find asymmetric money-output and credit-
output linkages, respectively. 
Nonlinear dependencies between credit and output take on special importance during 
banking crises. Banking crises are extreme examples of shocks to the credit market that 
should not only be capable of transferring the banking sector into the credit-rationing regime, 
but also significantly affect the economic activity. Thus, it is highly probable that banking 
crises impact the link between credit and output.  
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In the related literature on banking crises, disagreements persist on the casual direction 
of credit market conditions on economic growth. The falling output growth is considered as a 
good predictor of banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache 2005), which suggests that recessions may lead to banking crises and lower credit 
growth. There also exist effects in the opposite direction, because banking crises are usually 
accompanied by significant reductions in output growth (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
1998; Boyd, Kwak and Smith 2005; Hutchison and Noy 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache 
and Gupta 2006; Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann 2007).  
Our paper extends earlier empirical research by considering a new methodology to test 
for nonlinear linkages between credit and output during banking crises. We construct a 
regime-switching model that allows both credit and output to enter one of the regimes of calm 
and crises. Such a model fits well the theoretical arguments of changing relationships between 
credit and output during business and credit cycles. It also facilitates analysing linear and 
nonlinear dependencies between the banking sector performance and economic activity, 
because all bilateral linkages are allowed to change in different regimes of the economy.  
In contrast to earlier theoretical and empirical research, the proposed model allows the 
variables, credit and output growth, to change their regimes independently or at least in 
different periods. For example, the banking sector can follow or precede the real sector in 
entering the specific regimes of calm or crisis.  
This feature of our model enables us to test for asymmetric Granger causality and 
regime-dependence between credit and output, using the method recently proposed in 
Białkowski, Bohl and Serwa (2006). To our best knowledge, this is the first application of this 
novel methodology to the analyses of the link between credit and output. We further extend 
the set of possible hypotheses from Białkowski et al. by allowing for mixtures of asymmetric 
no-causality and no-dependence relationships, determined by the states of credit and real 
sectors. 
The applied tests provide important information on the sequence of entering the 
specific regimes by credit and output. If the processes of regime-switching for credit and 
output are independent, it suggests that banking crises have a limited impact on business 
cycles. Conversely, the regime-dependence implies lagged or instantaneous bidirectional 
causality between credit and output. In the presence of instantaneous causality the banking 
and real sectors most likely enter the crises simultaneously. If credit leads output into turmoil, 
then the crises affect real cycles and induce economic costs with a possible delay. If output 
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precedes credit into the crisis regime, it means that recessions increase the probability of 
banking crises in the next period.  
Our results indicate that both credit growth and output growth slow down significantly 
and become more volatile in turbulent periods. We find no significant evidence of causality 
effects from output to the credit market or in the opposite direction in any regime, but the 
credit sector and the real economy frequently enter the same regimes simultaneously. The 
model shows that the linear link between the analysed variables is also regime-dependent. The 
velocity of falling credit is also a good measure of the size of a banking crisis, which enables 
us to measure how the size of a crisis is related to the fall in output growth. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our regime-switching 
model explaining the behaviour of credit and output. The tests of causality and regime-
independence are also described. Section 3 discusses data and results from our testing 
framework and presents the final model. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Modelling the relationship between credit and output 
In this section we present our model of credit growth and output growth, and explain 
the methodology to test for nonlinear linkages between these variables.  
Azariadis and Smith (1998) construct a theoretical model, where the credit market and 
the real economy enter prosperity and slow-down regimes simultaneously. We extend their 
approach in our empirical analysis by considering the separate regime-switching processes of 
credit and output. Similar statistical models to the one employed in our analysis were used to 
estimate relationships between financial markets during crises, linkages between growth rates 
in different countries during business cycles, and dependencies between output growth and 
prices and stock returns (Phillips 1991, Ravn and Sola 1995, Edwards, Susmel 2001, Sola, 
Spagnolo and Spagnolo 2002). 
 Furthermore, we employ the methodology for testing asymmetric causality in a 
Markov switching framework, which was recently proposed by Białkowski, Bohl, and Serwa 
(2006). We also construct the additional tests that allow for switching between different types 
of credit-output dependencies over time.  
 
2.1. The model of credit growth and output growth 
Let Z  be the vector ],[ ′YX , where },;{ NtnxX nt ∈=  and },;{ NtnyY nt ∈=  are the 
two cross-sectional time series. The variables X and Y can be interpreted as real credit growth 
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and real output growth, respectively (the opposite setting, where X is an output growth and Y 
is a credit growth, is also used). Symbol n  denotes the market on which a banking crisis 
occurs and t  is the time index.  
Both variables are allowed to enter one of the two complementary states of "crisis" 
and "calm" periods.1 Using all four combinations of these states we construct a Markov 
process with four regimes and we use the index s  to denote these regimes. " X  and Y  are in 
the calm states" defines the first regime )1( =s . " X  is in the calm state and Y  is in the crisis 
state" denotes the second one )2( =s . The third regime indicates that " X  is in the crisis state 
and Y  is in the calm state" )3( =s . " X  and Y  are in the crisis states" defines the fourth 
regime )4( =s . At each point in time, the state s  is determined by an unobservable Markov 
chain. The dynamics of the Markov chain are described by a 44 ×  transition matrix P : 












=
44434241
34333231
24232221
14131211
pppp
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pppp
pppp
P , (1) 
where ijp  denotes the probability of changing the state from i  to j .  
Credit growth and output growth are conditionally normally distributed with means 
and variances dependent on the regimes of calm and crisis. We expect low means and high 
volatilities when both financial and real sectors are in the crisis state, and high means and low 
variances when both sectors are in the tranquil state.  
Lower mean of real credit growth during a banking crisis is usually due to bank 
failures, preventive policies of troubled banks, restrictive credit limits, lack of confidence in 
banks and lower deposit growth. Lower output growth is related to increased government 
spending and less borrowing during a crisis, which causes less investment, consumption and 
trade.  
Empirical studies show that low output growth is usually associated with increased 
output growth volatility, for example during financial crises (e.g. Ramey and Ramey 1995). 
Similarly, the variability of credit growth often changes during a crisis. Sudden drops in credit 
growth, caused by financial problems of banks, and rapid adjustments of credit markets to 
news may be responsible for the increased volatility. High variance of credit growth during 
crises also reflects different types of banking crises, where sizeable contractions in credit may 
                                                 
1
 We use expressions “states” and “regimes” interchangeably to discriminate between periods of calm and crisis. 
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happen after the burst of the lending bubble or less significant and more gradual credit 
tightening is possible during the long-lasting increase of non-performing loans.  
The parameter space for means, variances and covariances between credit and output 
variables is defined as follows: 
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and: 
 
{ }XYCCsXYCTsXYTCsXYTTs ρρρρρρρρρ ===== ==== 4321 ,,, .    (4) 
Symbol T
 
denotes the state of tranquility in the respective (banking or real) sector of the 
economy and symbol C denotes the crisis state.  
 Since we want to control for exogenous shocks to credit and output, we regress real 
credit growth and real output growth on a set of explanatory variables and use residuals from 
these regressions as our measures of X and Y. The exogenous variables employed in the 
analysis are explained in empirical results. 
 
2.2. The tests of causality and independence  
 We model the sequence of entering the crisis and tranquil states for the banking and 
real sector. The banking sector and the real sector may enter crisis and calm states 
independently, credit may lead output, or output may lead credit into one of the regimes. We 
consider three types of inter-sector dependencies, i.e. causality, “strong” form of causality, 
and regime-independence. 
 We understand causality in the Granger sense as evidence that the probability of 
variable X (or variable Y) entering the specific state depends on past information about the 
states of X and Y (Granger 1980). In our Markov switching model, the distribution of a 
process generating the state of X (or Y) at time t depends on the state of Y (or X, respectively) 
at time t–1, as in Białkowski, Bohl and Serwa (2006). Therefore, we call such a dependence 
“regime-causality”.  
The strong form of causality is present when Y (X) always enters the specific state if X 
(Y) was in that state one period earlier (Sola, Spagnolo and Spagnolo 2002). Regime-
independence is defined as the setting, where the states of X and Y change independently. 
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 The appropriate tests for particular inter-sector relationships are constructed by 
restricting the transition matrix P  (e.g. Phillips 1991). For example, when the independent 
regime switching of the two variables X and Y is considered, the transition matrix takes the 
form: 

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,    (5)  
where Qijpi  denotes the probability of entering the state j  by the time series Q  at time t , 
when it was in the state i  at time 1−t . },{ YXQ ∈ , },{, CTji ∈ , and T  and C  denote the 
calm and crisis regimes, respectively. It should be noted that regime-independence does not 
imply independence of X  and Y  since they are still allowed to be correlated with each other. 
Under the regime-causality hypothesis, the probability of variable Y entering the 
specific state of calm or crisis may depend on the state of variable X in the previous period. 
For example, weaker credit market conditions during the banking crisis may increase the 
probability of recession in the economy in the next period. In contrast, the variable X will not 
lead the variable Y into one of the regimes when the following restrictions are imposed on the 
transition matrix: 













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−+−+
−+−+
=
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P .    (6) 
These restrictions are equivalent to the following conditions: 
calm)in   and crisisin   |crisisin  Pr(crisis)in   and crisisin   |crisisin  Pr( 1111 −−−− = tttttt XYYXYY , 
calm)in   and calmin   |crisisin  Pr(crisis)in   and calmin   |crisisin  Pr( 1111 −−−− = tttttt XYYXYY , 
calm)in   and crisisin   |calmin  Pr(crisis)in   and crisisin   |calmin  Pr( 1111 −−−− = tttttt XYYXYY , 
calm)in   and calmin   |calmin  Pr(crisis)in   and calmin   |calmin  Pr( 1111 −−−− = tttttt XYYXYY . 
We can also analyse a more restrictive (“strong”) form of causality between the 
variables X and Y when Y always enters the specific state if X was in that state one period 
earlier (Sola, Spagnolo and Spagnolo 2002). For example, the credit market may always 
follow the real sector into recession with one period delay. Then, the transition matrix equals: 
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The restrictions in the transition matrix translate into the following conditions: 
1calm)in   and calmin   |calmin  Pr( 11 =−− ttt XYY , 
1calm)in   and crisisin   |calmin  Pr( 11 =−− ttt XYY , 
1crisis)in   and calmin   |crisisin  Pr( 11 =−− ttt XYY , 
1crisis)in   and crisisin   |crisisin  Pr( 11 =−− ttt XYY . 
We also consider asymmetric types of relationships between credit and output, where 
the relationship changes when the appropriate variable X or Y switches into the other state. 
For example, the first (latter) two rows of the transition matrix (7) correspond with X being in 
the calm (crisis) state in the previous period. Thus, it is possible to test for a “strong” form of 
causality from X to Y provided that X was in the calm (crisis) state in the previous period, by 
restricting only the first (latter) two rows of the transition matrix (7).  
Similarly, the independence hypothesis given that X was in the calm (crisis) state in 
the previous period can be analyzed by restricting only the two first (latter) rows of the 
transition matrix (5). When the first and third (second and fourth) row is restricted in (5), the 
condition is that Y was in the calm (crisis) state in the previous period. 
Slightly differently, there is no causality from X to Y provided that Y (not X) was in the 
calm (crisis) state in the previous period when the third (second) row of the transition matrix 
is left constrained in (6).  
Combinations of these hypotheses are also possible when the appropriate rows from 
matrices (5), (6) and (7) are combined. However, the rows from the particular matrices must 
always replace rows with the same index in the combined matrix. For example, we consider 
the hypothesis that there is no causality from X to Y when Y was in the crisis regime one 
period earlier, and there is no regime-dependence between X and Y when Y was in the calm 
regime one period earlier. Such a hypothesis can be introduced into the model by including 
the second row from matrix (6), the first and third row from matrix (5) into the transition 
matrix P, and leaving the fourth row unrestricted: 
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All restrictions in the transition matrices (5), (6), (7), and (8) of our Markov switching 
model are tested using the likelihood ratio (LR) test, where the log-likelihood value from the 
model with the unrestricted transition matrix (1), edunrestrictl  is compared with the log-
likelihood of the restricted model, restrictedl :  
)(~)(2 2 kllLR restrictededunrestrict χ−= .      (9) 
Under the null hypothesis of no restrictions (equation 1), the LR statistic is distributed as chi-
squared with k degrees of freedom, where k equals the number of independent restrictions 
(e.g. Sola, Spagnolo and Spagnolo 2002).  
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1. Data 
 Our analysis covers the sample of 103 banking crises in developed and developing 
economies. The crises come from the electronic database prepared by Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) who define banking crises as “much or all of bank capital being exhausted”. Such 
crises typically comprise large-scale bank failures, depositor runs, the high level of non-
performing loans, or some emergency actions of the government, i.e. deposit freezes, 
nationalizations, recapitalization plans, etc. (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta, 
2006). The database of Caprio and Klingebiel provides the approximate starting dates and in 
most cases the ending dates of crises, but the authors argue that these dates are often difficult 
to determine and may not be accurate (see Table 1).  
We use the time series of annual data beginning four years before the approximate 
start of each crisis and ending four years after the start of each crisis, because we focus on the 
periods immediately surrounding the crises and want to minimize the effects of other factors, 
such as long-run business and credit cycles, on credit and output growth.2 Altogether there are 
824 panel observations of real credit growth and real output growth. The real credit growth is 
                                                 
2
 We do not use quarterly data, because we expect lagged dependencies of order higher than one when using 
such data. The Markov-switching model and our tests are designed to test for lagged dependencies of order one. 
Additionally, the quarterly seasonality of output growth and credit growth complicates analyses of causality 
between credit and output, because periods of prosperity and stagnation, and seasonal patterns of output and 
credit growth may be difficult to differentiate in our four-regime setting.  
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measured as log changes in the ratio of domestic credit (line 32 in the IFS database from the 
International Monetary Fund) to consumer price index (line 64 in the IFS database) and the 
real output growth equals the log changes in the ratio of GDP (line 99b in the IFS database) to 
GDP deflator (line 99bip). 
Instead of considering fixed or random effects in our panel dataset, which could 
significantly complicate our analysis, we use changes in the real effective exchange rate, the 
level of market interest rate, and suitable measures of financial, economic, and political 
development as our control variables explaining differences in dynamics of credit and output 
growth in different countries. The measure of financial development is the ratio of deposits to 
money supply in each country, averaged over the pre-crisis and crisis period. The political 
development measure, obtained from the POLITY IV database, is an indicator of the level of 
democracy for each country and year.3 Similarly, Gross National Income per capita for each 
country from the year 1975, obtained from the World Bank database, is used as a proxy for 
the long-term level of economic development. All variables except the latter two use data 
from the IFS database of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
3.2. Testing the hypotheses 
 We empirically investigate the relationship between real credit growth and real output 
growth during banking crises. We rely on the Markov-switching mixture of normal 
distributions to identify the periods of calm and crisis for both variables. For the credit growth 
and the output growth, the crisis regime is defined as a state with a lower mean value, 
nevertheless the volatility in this state is always higher than in the calm regime. We start with 
estimating the twenty specifications of our model, which correspond to different restrictions 
in the transition matrix and directions of causality. These specifications are equivalent to 
different hypotheses of no-causality, “strong” causality and regime-independence, and are 
presented in the first column of Table 3. 
 We use the general-to-specific approach to find the final specification of our model, as 
described in Białkowski, Bohl and Serwa (2006). When the hypotheses are not nested or the 
tests do not give an unequivocal answer, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used to 
select between different specifications. The likelihood ratio statistics are employed to test the 
                                                 
3
 The POLITY IV database is maintained through a partnership between the University of Maryland’s Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management and the George Mason University Center for Global 
Policy. 
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restrictions of regime-independence (equation 5), no causality (equation 6), and “strong” 
causality (equation 7) against the hypothesis of bilateral causality (equation 1).  
Each specification of our model is estimated in five different versions denoted as 
Model 1 to Model 5. In Model 1, the explained variables X and Y are the growth rates of real 
credit and real output. In Model 2, we first regress the explained variables on the three 
measures of financial, political and economic development and then use residuals from these 
regressions as dependent variables in the Markov switching model.  
In Model 3, we include market interest rates and changes in the real effective exchange 
rate as additional explanatory variables and proceed as with Model 2. The data samples in 
Model 2 (728 observations of each variable) and Model 3 (616 observations) are shorter than 
the sample in Model 1 (824 observations) due to the lack of some observations in explanatory 
variables. Model 4 is the same as Model 1, but a shorter sample is taken from Model 3 in 
order to check if a lower number of observations change our results. Model 5 (680 
observations of each variable) uses changes in the real effective exchange rate and changes in 
market interest rates as the only explanatory variables.  
The initial results from estimation of regressions in Models 1 to 5 are presented in 
Table 2. We find that the financial and economic development measures, the market interest 
rate and the constant term are always significant in credit and output equations. The political 
regime is important only for the growth of credit and changes in the real effective exchange 
rate are never significant in our regressions.  
The original observations of real credit growth and real output growth in Models 1 and 
4, and residuals from regressions in Models 2, 3 and 5 are then used in estimations of our 
Markov-switching models and tests of the no-causality and independence hypotheses, as 
shown in Table 3. The investigated hypotheses are explained in the first column of Table 3. 
The degrees of freedom, used in the likelihood ratio (LR) tests of corresponding hypotheses, 
are reported in the second column. In the next columns, the values of the LR test and BIC are 
presented for each version and specification of the model. 
From the reported results we find that the hypotheses of “strong” causality are 
uniformly rejected across different versions of our model. Furthermore, the hypothesis of no 
causality is never rejected, which suggests that neither credit leads output nor output leads 
credit in any regime. It means that information about the actual state of output growth does 
not help explaining the future state of credit growth and the credit growth is not useful in 
predicting output growth. This result is also robust to different combinations of explanatory 
variables in Models 1 to 5. 
 11 
The regime-independence hypothesis is marginally rejected in Model 1 and it is not 
rejected in Models 2 to 5. Additionally, the information criterion suggests that the best model 
is the one indicating regime-independence between credit and output in both regimes of calm 
and crisis. However, the second best model is the less restrictive specification indicating no 
regime-dependence when one of the variables is in the crisis regime, and no causality but 
instantaneous regime-dependence between credit and output when that variable is in the calm 
regime. The regime-independence only in the situation when credit growth was in the calm 
regime one period earlier is rejected in more instances.  
These outcomes suggest that there is some evidence of instantaneous regime-
dependence between the analyzed variables. Credit and output may often enter the crisis and 
calm regimes at the same time when they both are in the calm regime one period earlier. 
Another result is that the likelihood ratio values also depend on the number of 
observations (and crises). When the number of observations is low, as in Models 3 and 4, the 
LR tests may fail to distinguish between opposite specifications. For example, the hypothesis 
of regime-independence is not rejected and the hypothesis of “strong” causality from output to 
credit in the crisis regime is only marginally rejected in Model 4. Therefore, we proceed with 
Model 1 employing the largest number of observations in our further analysis.4 
 Table 4 presents parameters of the final Model 1, satisfying the hypothesis of no 
regime-dependence in times of crisis and no causality from output to credit in the calm 
regime, i.e. the second best (and less restrictive) specification, as explained above. In the 
crisis regimes, the mean credit growth and the mean output growth are significantly lower 
than in the calm regimes. The rate of real credit growth drops by about 8 percentage points 
annually and the rate of annual real growth slows down by 5 percentage points during crises. 
An additional cost of banking crises is the volatility of both variables that increases almost 
twenty fold in times of turbulence.  
What is important, the covariance between credit and output is significant in each 
regime, which points to the presence of conditional linear relationship between these variables 
in calm and crisis regimes. This relationship is regime-dependent, because the sign of the 
covariance changes between regimes. The correlation is usually positive, but it becomes 
negative when credit is in the calm state and output enters the crisis state. The banking sector 
                                                 
4
 In order to examine how our model fits the data we use tests proposed by Breunig, Najarian, and Pagan (2003) 
and confirm that the parameters of sample means and variances simulated from our model are consistent with the 
original data. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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loses its positive link with the real economy usually in those situations when it precedes the 
real sector in leaving the crisis regime during the turmoil, i.e. in the third regime. 
From the estimated parameters in the transition matrix one can infer that all four 
regimes are quite persistent. Once credit and output enter one of these regimes, they stay there 
for a longer period, as indicated by the values on the diagonal of the transition matrix. 
All regimes together reveal some interesting patterns of shock transmission between 
the banking sector and the real economy (Figure 1). There is only a small probability (0.124) 
that credit and output will leave the first regime, where both variables are in the calm state. 
When they leave that regime, they usually enter the fourth state of the Markov switching 
model, where both variables are in the crisis regime. The banking and the real sector enter the 
crisis simultaneously, which confirms our previous result of no causality between output and 
credit.  
From the fourth state the credit and the output most often enter the second regime, less 
likely the third regime, and rarely the first regime. In the second regime, output growth is in 
the calm state, while the banking sector still suffers from the crisis. This suggests that the real 
sector is the first to shake off the banking crisis and the crises may have shorter-term effects 
on output growth than on credit market conditions. Since the most often visited regime, when 
leaving the second regime, is the first one, we can infer that both sectors usually finish in the 
state of calm.  
Similarly, when credit and output are in the third regime, where the credit market 
raises and the real sector experiences turbulences, the next most likely step for the system is to 
enter the first regime. This result can be interpreted in the way that the depressed real sector 
rarely initiates a banking crisis in the next period. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 This paper proposes a new methodology to test for nonlinear linkages between the 
banking and real sector during banking crises. While employing a variety of tests we observe 
no significant causality between output growth and credit growth in times of banking crises, 
even after controlling for the impact of measures of financial, political, economic 
development and changing interest and foreign exchange rates. Instead, some specifications 
reveal a nonlinear instantaneous relationship between the analyzed variables when credit or 
output is in the calm state. This relationship is asymmetric and depends on the state of one of 
the variables. 
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In addition, there is a linear instantaneous relationship between credit and output, as 
indicated by the significant covariances between credit and output growth in each regime. 
However, this relationship is also regime-dependent. Most of the time the covariance is 
positive, but it becomes negative when the real sector enters the recession and the credit 
sector expands. This result confirms the statement from our introduction that banking crises 
impact the link between credit and output.  
The report about the real credit growth reduced by 8 percentage points and the real 
output growth reduced by 5 percentage points annually during crisis periods, together with the 
results indicating the significantly increased volatility of both variables, corroborate earlier 
outcomes pointing to large costs suffered by economies around banking crises. These 
outcomes certainly do not show that the whole reduction in output growth is caused by the 
declining credit growth, because there are other exogenous variables contributing to these 
changes. Nevertheless, the analyzed sample, closely linked to periods of banking crises, 
increases the likelihood that the banking sector significantly affects economic activity.  
Although our empirical model fits well the theoretical construction proposed by 
Azariadis and Smith (1998), the presented results are not meant to prove that shifts in regimes 
of output growth are solely due to credit-rationing conditions and future studies may show 
how other factors influence the changing regimes in real sectors. Our results illustrate the 
dynamics and interdependencies between credit and output around banking crises.  
Some versions of the proposed Markov switching model can be employed for practical 
purposes. An appropriate specification of the transition matrix in this model makes it possible 
to estimate the probabilities of entering the specific states of calm or crises by the credit and 
output variables. International investors can employ analogous models to estimate more 
accurately output growth in countries facing financial crises. Banking sector authorities can 
calculate the probabilities of financial instability, given the actual state of the real and 
financial sectors. The results obtained from the estimation of the transition matrix enable 
economists to better understand the behavior of the banking and real sectors of the economy 
during crises, i.e. the sequence of entering the specific regimes of calm and crisis.  
 14 
References 
Azariadis, Costas, Smith, Bruce, 1998. Financial Intermediation and Regime Switching in 
Business Cycles . American Economic Review 88 (3), 516-536 (June). 
Balke, Nathan S., 2000. Credit and Economic Activity: Credit Regimes and Nonlinear 
Propagation of Shocks. Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (2), 344-349 (May).  
Bernanke, Ben S., Gertler, Mark L., 1989, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations. American Economic Review 79 (1), 14-31 (March). 
Białkowski, Jędrzej, Bohl, Martin T., Serwa, Dobromił, 2006. Testing for financial spillovers 
in calm and turbulent periods. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 46 (3), 397-
412 (July).  
Blinder, Alan S., 1987. Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures. Economic Journal 97 
(386), 327-352 (June).  
Blinder, Alan S., Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1983. Money, Credit Constraints, and Economic 
Activity. American Economic Review 73 (2), 297-302 (May). 
Boyd, John H., Kwak, Sungkyu, Smith, Bruce, 2005. The Real Output Losses Associated 
with Modern Banking Crises. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 37 (6), 977-999 
(December). 
Breunig, Robert, Najarian, Serinah, Pagan, Adrian, 2003. Specification Testing of Markov 
Switching Models. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 65 (s1), 703-725 
(December). 
Calza, Alessandro, Sousa, João, 2006. Output and Inflation Responses to Credit Shocks: Are 
There Threshold Effects in the Euro Area? Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & 
Econometrics 10 (2), Article 3. 
Caprio, Gerard, Klingebiel, Daniela, 2003. Episodes of systemic and borderline financial 
crises. World Bank, Washington (January). 
Cordoba, Juan-Carlos, Ripoll, Marla, 2004, Credit Cycles Redux, International Economic 
Review 45 (4), 1011-1046 (November).  
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Detragiache, Enrica, 1998. The determinants of banking crises: 
evidence from developing and developed countries. IMF Staff Papers 45, 81-109. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Detragiache, Enrica, 2005. Cross-country empirical studies of systemic 
bank distress: a survey. National Institute Economic Review 192, 68-83 (April). 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Detragiache, Enrica, Gupta, Poonam, 2006. Inside the crisis: An 
empirical analysis of banking systems in distress. Journal of International Money and 
Finance 25 (5), 702-718 (August).  
 15 
Edwards, Sebastian, Susmel, Raul, 2001. Volatility dependence and contagion in emerging 
equity markets. Journal of Development Economics 66 (2), 505-532 (December). 
Galbraith, John W, 1996. Credit Rationing and Threshold Effects in the Relation between 
Money and Output. Journal of Applied Econometrics 11(4), 419-29 (July-August). 
Granger, Clive W. J., 1980. Testing for causality: A personal viewpoint. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control 2, 329-352. 
Hutchison, Michael M., Noy, Ilan, 2005. How Bad Are Twins? Output Costs of Currency and 
Banking Crises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37 (4), 725-752 (August). 
Kaminsky, Graciela L., Reinhart, Carmen M., 1999. The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking 
and Balance-Of-Payments Problems. American Economic Review 89 (3), 473-500 
(June). 
Kaufmann, Sylvia, Valderrama, Maria T., 2007. The Role of Credit Aggregates and Asset 
Prices in the Transmission Mechanism. A Comparison between the Euro Area and the 
US, ECB Working Paper 816 (September). 
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, Moore, John, 1997. Credit Cycles, Journal of Political Economy 105 (2), 
211-248 (April). 
McCallum, John, 1991. Credit Rationing and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. 
American Economic Review 81 (4), 946-951 (September). 
Psaradakis, Zacharias, Ravn, Morten O., Sola, Martin, 2005. Markov Switching Causality and 
the Money-Output Relationship, Journal of Applied Econometrics 20 (5), 665-683. 
Phillips, Kerk L., 1991. A Two-Country Model of Stochastic Output with Changes in Regime, 
Journal of International Economics 31 (1-2), 121-142 (August). 
Ramey, Garey, Ramey, Valerie A., 1995. Cross-Country Evidence on the Link Between 
Volatility and Growth. American Economic Review 85 (5), 1138-1151 (December). 
Ranciere, Romain, Tornell, Aaron, Westermann, Frank, 2007. Systemic Crises and Growth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Ravn, Morten O. Sola, Martin, 1995. Stylized facts and regime changes: Are prices 
procyclical? Journal of Monetary Economics 36 (3), 497-526 (December). 
Sola, Martin, Spagnolo, Fabio, Spagnolo, Nicola, 2002. A test for volatility spillovers. 
Economics Letters 76 (1), 77-84 (June). 
 16 
Table 1: Analyzed periods around banking crises  
Developed countries:   
Australia 1985-1992 (1989) 
Canada 1979-1986 (1983) 
Denmark 1983-1990 (1987) 
Finland 1987-1994 (1991) 
Germany 1973-1980 (1977) 
Greece 1987-1994 (1991) 
Norway 1983-1990 (1987)  
Spain 1973-1980 (1977) 
Sweden 1987-1994 (1991) 
Hong Kong 1994-2001 (1998) 
Iceland 1981-1988 (1985) 
Iceland 1989-1996 (1993) 
Italy 1986-1993 (1990) 
 
Japan 1987-1994 (1991) 
Korea 1993-2000 (1997) 
New Zealand 1983-1990 (1987) 
United Kingdom 1970-1977 (1974) 
United Kingdom 1986-1993 (1990) 
United States 1982-1990 (1986) 
Developing countries:       
Algeria 1986-1993 (1990) 
Argentina 1976-1983 (1980) 
Argentina 1985-1992 (1989) 
Argentina 1997-2004 (2001) 
Benin 1984-1991 (1988) 
Bolivia 1982-1989 (1986) 
Bolivia 1990-1997 (1994) 
Botswana 1990-1997 (1994) 
Brazil 1986-1993 (1990) 
Brazil 1990-1997 (1994) 
Burkina Faso 1984-1991 (1988) 
Burundi 1990-1997 (1994) 
Cameroon 1983-1990 (1987) 
Central African Republic 1984-
1991 (1988)  
Chad 1988-1995 (1992)  
Chile 1972-1979 (1976)  
Chile 1977-1984 (1981) 
Colombia 1978-1985 (1982) 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
(former Zaire) 1987-1994 (1991) 
Congo, Republic of 1988-1995 
(1992)  
Costa Rica 1983-1990 (1987?)  
Costa Rica 1990-1997 (1994) 
Cote d’Ivoire 1984-1991 (1988)  
Ecuador 1978-1985 (1982?)  
Ecuador 1987-1994 (1991) 
Ecuador 1994-2001 (1998) 
Egypt 1987-1994 (1991)  
El Salvador 1985-1992 (1989)  
Ethiopia 1990-1997 (1994) 
Gabon 1991-1998 (1995) 
Gambia 1981-1988 (1985) 
Ghana 1978-1985 (1982) 
Hungary 1987-1994 (1991) 
India 1989-1996 (1993) 
Indonesia 1990-1997 (1994) 
Indonesia 1993-2000 (1997) 
Israel 1973-1980 (1977)  
Jamaica 1990-1997 (1994) 
Jordan 1985-1992 (1989) 
Kenya 1981-1988 (1985) 
Kenya 1988-1995 (1992) 
Kenya 1992-1999 (1996) 
Kuwait 1976-1983 (1980?) 
Lesotho 1984-1991 (1988) 
Madagascar 1984-1991 (1988) 
Malaysia 1981-1988 (1985)  
Malaysia 1993-2000 (1997) 
Mauritius 1992-1999 (1996) 
Mexico 1977-1984 (1981) 
Mexico 1990-1997 (1994) 
Morocco 1977-1984 (1981?) 
Myanmar 1992-1999 (1996) 
Nepal 1984-1991 (1988) 
Niger 1979-1986 (1983) 
Nigeria 1989-1996 (1993) 
Panama 1984-1991 (1988) 
  
Papua New Guinea 1984-1991 
(1988) 
Paraguay 1991-1998 (1995) 
Peru 1979-1986 (1983) 
Philippines 1977-1984 (1981) 
Philippines 1994-2001 (1998) 
Poland 1989-1996 (1993?)  
Romania 1986-1993 (1990) 
Russia 1994-2001 (1998) 
Rwanda 1987-1994 (1991) 
Senegal 1984-1991 (1988) 
Sierra Leone 1986-1993 (1990) 
Singapore 1978-1985 (1982) 
South Africa 1973-1980 (1977) 
South Africa 1985-1992 (1989) 
Sri Lanka 1985-1992 (1989) 
Tanzania 1985-1992 (1989?) 
Thailand 1979-1986 (1983) 
Thailand 1993-2000 (1997) 
Togo 1989-1996 (1993) 
Tunisia 1987-1994 (1991) 
Turkey 1978-1985 (1982) 
Turkey 1990-1997 (1994) 
Turkey 1996-2003 (2000) 
Ukraine 1993-2000 (1997)  
Uruguay 1977-1984 (1981) 
Venezuela 1976-1983 (1980?) 
Venezuela 1990-1997 (1994) 
Zimbabwe 1991-2008 (1995) 
Note: The probable starting dates of banking crises, provided in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), are presented in 
parentheses. These probable starting dates are used to construct samples around banking crises in our analysis. 
The symbol “?” denotes the most likely starting date of a banking crisis when the exact year was not given in 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).  
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Table 2: Controlling for various dependencies in the regressions  
of credit growth and output growth 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Explained variable: real output growth 
const 0.024*** (0.003) 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.052*** 
(0.006) 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.039*** 
(0.004) 
financial development  -0.063*** (0.018) 
-0.060** 
(0.025)   
economic development  -0.248*** (0.079) 
-0.368*** 
(0.091)   
political development  0.245 (0.469) 
0.407 
(0.592)   
changes in REER   0.018 (0.026)  
0.017 
(0.022) 
interest rate   -0.347*** (0.082)  
-0.572*** 
(0.082) 
number of observations 824 728 616 616 680 
R2 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04 
DW 1.35 1.50 1.47 1.54 1.36 
explained variable: real credit growth 
const 0.025** (0.010) 
0.091*** 
(0.021) 
0.123*** 
(0.023) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.070*** 
(0.013) 
financial development  -0.354*** (0.094) 
-0.390*** 
(0.094)   
economic development  0.965*** (0.314) 
0.674* 
(0.375)   
political development  -5.422*** (1.366) 
-5.279*** 
(1.277)   
changes in REER   0.062 (0.105)  
0.123 
(0.116) 
interest rate   -0.977* (0.564)  
-1.801*** 
(0.523) 
number of observations 824 728 616 616 680 
R2 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.04 
DW 1.44 1.62 1.63 1.44 1.48 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance of the parameter at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1: The most likely sequence of entering  
the specific regimes by credit and output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Solid arrows point to the most likely scenario. Dotted arrows indicate the less likely 
scenario. 
   Regime 1: 
Credit in calm 
Output in calm 
   Regime 2: 
Credit in crisis 
Output in calm 
   Regime 3: 
Credit in calm 
Output in crisis 
   Regime 4: 
Credit in crisis 
Output in crisis 
 
